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WILLIAM MITCHELL
ON December 15, 1899, Judge Mitchell filed his last judicial
opinion, and on August 21, 1900, his life came to an end.
The lapse of twenty years has not dimmed, but increased his
reputation as a judge. Today, he is generally accorded a place
in the group of great American judges whom all lawyers de-
light to honor. It is a source of pardonable pride to the bar of
Minnesota to know that he began his career in their ranks. Of
those who encountered him when he was in practice, all are
gone, so far as the writer has been able to ascertain, except
Honorable Charles C. Willson of Rochester. Only a few are
left who appeared before him when he was a district judge.
Many members of the bar of today never saw him. The time
has already come when he is known to most lawyers solely
through his published opinions. In the belief that they, and
those preparing for the bar, will be interested in knowing more
abouthim, this sketch of his life and work has been written. A
more extended account, prepared by the late Judge Jaggard, is
contained in Volume VIII of Lewis' Great American Lawyers.
William Mitchell was born November 18, 1832, the son of
John Mitchell and Mary (Henderson) Mitchell, who were both
natives of Scotland. His boyhood was spent on his father's
farm near Niagara Falls in Welland County, Ontario. After
attending the public schools in Canada, he entered Jefferson
College at Cannonsburg, Pennsylvania, graduating with the class
of 1853. It was here that he met Eugene M. Wilson, who be-
came one of his intimate friends. The latter lived at Morgan-
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
town, then in Virginia but now in West Virginia, where his
father was a lawyer.' On leaving college, he went to Morgantown
and read law in the office of his friend's father. He was thus
occupied until 1857, with an interval of about two years when
he taught in an academy at Morgantown. He was admitted to
the bar in that year and, accompanied by young Wilson, left
Virginia to seek his fortune in the West. In April the two
young men landed at Winona, Minnesota, having journeyed up
the Mississippi River on a steamboat, with many others, also on
their way to Minnesota. Winona was just emerging from a
boom period and, as a consequence, nearly every one found
himself the owner of town lots, bought at extravagant prices in
the expectation of speedily reselling them at a profit. These
expectations had been disappointed, the boom had collapsed,
every one was in debt, mdney was scarce, and the time was not
a propitious one for the arrival of two young lawyers in search
of their forttines., Nevertheless they both stayed-one for nearly
all the remaining years of his life, the other for a few years. The
impression mtade by the conditions found at Winona was lasting.
Years after, in one of his opinions, judge Mitchell drew upon
his early recollections, when he said :'
"Nothing would be more unjust than to test a man's acts in
1889, while the real estate boom still continued, by the conditions
existing in 1897. No one who has not passed through one of
these booms can realize how extravagant men become in their
opinions as to the values of property, and how largely the judg-
ment of even ordinarily prudent and conservative business men
is influenced by the atmosphere surrounding them. After the
boom has subsided, men can hardly believe that persons of ordi-
nary business capacity and intelligence could ever have enter-
tained such extravagant ideas of value; and hence, even when
we honestly attempt to judge of their actions in the light of the
conditions then existing, our judgment is liable to be uncon-
sciously influenced by the changed conditions now existing."
The two young men engaged in practice as partners, under
the firm name of Wilson & Mitchell, but the firm was soon dis-
solved by the former's removal to Minneapolis. Judge Mitchell
continued to practice at Winona until 1874. In later years he
would refer to this period as being, on the whole, the most
enjoyable of his life.
He married in 1857, and established the home where he reared
his family. His domestic life was happy. He lived comfortably,
IWheadon v. Mead, (1898) 72 Minn. 372, 376, 75 N. W. 598.
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but simply. Those who entered his home were met with the
hospitality characteristic of earlier days .and with an innate 'cour-
tesy and cordiality which were peculiarly his own. He prized
his home life and his Winona friends so highly that for many
years after he became a justice of ihe Minnesota supreme court,
it was his weekly practice to make the trip from St. Paul to
Winona to spend Sunday at home, returning in time for the
opening of court on Monday.
His professional life was fortunate. He soon gained an
enviable standing at the bar and acquired an excellent practice.
He always had a partner in business. Daniel S. Norton, after-
wards United States Senator from Minnesota, succeeded Wilson,
and, when Norton went to Washington, William H. Yale, at one
time Lieutenant Governor of the state, became his partner under
the firm name of Mitchell & Yale. His name, or that of his
firm, appears frequently in the early Minnesota Reports, begin-
ning with the case of Bingham v. Board of Supervisors of Wi-
uona
2 and ending with Sherwood v. St.. Paul & Chicago Railway
Co. 3
The Winona bar, during his time, numbered among its mem-
bers several men of superior ability and attainments. In addition
to those already mentioned, there was Thomas Wilson, first, judge
of the third judicial district, then, chief justice of the supreme
court and finally engaged in private practice, where he became
one of the most skillful trial lawyers the state has ever had.
With him, he contracted a friendship which continued for life,
although the two men were of wholly different temperaments.
Another Winona lawyer who was his contemporary was William
Windom, who was sent to Congress, first as a Representative,
and later as Senator from Minnesota, and who died while holding
the office of Secretary of the Treasury. Another was Charles
H. Berry, first Attorney General of Minnesota and for a time a
United States District Judge in the territory of Idaho. Contact
with these men and with others of, perhaps, equal ability though
less widely known, was, of itself, an education. A contest with
them was a test of one's ability to survive. The years in which
he was engaged in practice were those in which his habits of
work were formed. It was a troubled period in our history,
including the dark years of the Civil War when the country
2 (1863) 8 Minn. 441, 443.
3 (1875) 21 Minn. 127, 128.
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was aflame with passion, the bitter ones of reconstruction after
the war was over, and those of reckless speculation which came
later and were followed by the great financial panic of 1873.
During all of them he was occupied with his profession, though
not to the exclusion of everything else. He gave freely of his
time and ability to advance the interests of the community where
he lived. He served one term in the State Legislature at the
session of 1859-1860; one as County Attorney in 1863-1864;
represented his ward in the City Council for four years; was a
director of the Public Library; trustee of the Cemetery Asso-
ciation; a director of the LaCrosse, Trempealeau & Prescott
Railroad Co., a railroad which linked Winona with the roads
from the east, which then terminated at LaCrosse, Wisconsin;
the first president of the Winona & Southwestern Railroad Co.,
when it was organized in 1872 under a special act of the legisla-
ture; and an incorporator and the first president of the Winona
Savings Bank, organized in 1874. He was not fond of office,
public or private, but, when pressed into service, was thorough
and attentive in the performance of his duties.
He was a diligent student and keen observer and was blessed
with an excellent memory. His mind was stored with solid
information covering a wide field. No one who knew him well
can fail to recall his extensive fund of knowledge, his shrewd
wisdom, and his independence of judgment. The last character-
istic is illustrated by his political connections. Originally a
republican and an adherent of that party during the war, he
left it owing to his disapproval of the course of its leaders during
the reconstruction period, and was thereafter identified with the
democratic party. In 1896, he was unable to subscribe to his
party's policy with reference to the coinage of silver, and did not
allow his long association with it to influence him in casting his
ballot or in giving expression to his views.
By nature, he was peace-loving, and shunned conflicts,
although he bore himself manfully when attacked. His coolness
and self-control, his great knowledge of legal principles, his sure
application of them, his ready comprehension of the vital facts
in a case, his fairness in stating them, and his transparent honesty
combined to make him a formidable adversary in the court room,
although he never enjoyed the trial of jury cases. As a coun-
sellor, he was of transcendent merit. After seventeen years
of practice, he had an established clientage with unbounded con-
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fidence in him, a solid reputation for intelligence and ability, a
wide acquaintance, and no enemies except those that every good
man makes if he acquitg himself as he should on every occasion.
His friends had long recognized in him the qualities that go to
the making of a good judge, and in 1874 he was elected judge
of the district court of the third district and began a judicial
career which was destined to continue until only a few months
before his death. For over seven years he held the office of
district judge, conducting it to the entire satisfaction of every
one. He was an ideal trial judge. He heard counsel attentively
and patiently, made no display of his own learning, earnestly
desired to get at the vital facts of the case, readily detected shams
and fallacies, was singularly free from prejudices, and bent
wholly on doing justice to the parties to a controversy. It has
been said of him by one who knew, that no defeated litigant
ever left his court room who did not go away satisfied that he
had been given a fair trial or who was not convinced that his
case had rdceived the most attentive and careful consideration.
He was prompt, as well as painstaking, in the dispatch of busi-
ness and, hence, the work of the court was not burdensome to
him. He found time to enjoy the simple wholesome pleasures
that in later years want of leisure compelled him to forego. He
was an out-of-door man and a confirmed fisherman. The Mis-
sissippi Valley, in the vicinity of Winona, afforded numerous
opportunities for the outings he enjoyed. There were many
small streams which abounded with trout. He used to relate
with zest how he had enjoyed to the full many a summer's day
along one of these streams until nightfall found him with a
basket filled with trout and a drive homeward before him, with
a keen appetite for the late supper that awaited him. The river
was famous for its bass fishing and he often said there was no
better test of a fisherman's skill than his ability to hook and land
a three pound bass in the swift water where that fish is usually
found. Years after, when his fishing trips had become less
frequent, he was drawing on his own experience when he said:
"It is a matter of common knowledge that different species
of fish, good and bad, those that take the hook readily, and those
that do not, inhabit the same waters."'4
He was fond of gardening, and the grounds about his home
abounded with flowers and shrubbery. Books were among his
4 State v. Mrozinski, (1894) 59 Minn. 465, 467, 61 N. W. 560, 27 L. R.
A. 76.
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best friends, and he is said to have had one of the habits of the
true book-lover-reading in bed. He was abstemious, but
charitable in his judgment of men who were not. He often
remarked, that a man who had no small vices was not equipped
with a safety valve for the escape of surplus energy that might
become explosive if not provided with an outlet. He was reared
in the Presbyterian faith and gave his life-long support to that
church, although not a member. He respected churches and the
clergy, among whom he numbered several special friends.
His figure was erect and slender, his features clear cut, his
face bearded, his eyes dark and penetrating, his cast of counte-
nance sober and thoughtful and apt to give an impression of
austerity until his face lit up with a smile, as itusually did when
he was engaged in conversation. He -was a man of reserve and
native dignity, not apt to make advances in forming acquaintances,
but a firm and loyal friend when once he bestowed his friendship
upon any one.
Possessed of these traits and with these experiences, in his
forty-ninth year he was appointed by Governor Pillsbury as one
of the Associate Justices of the state supreme court immediately
after the legislature increased .their number from two to four.
He took his seat at the opening of the April Term in 1881.
His opinions while a member of that court are the principal
source of his great reputation. His life theretofore was at
unconscious preparation for the performance of the tasks that
he was now called upon to do. The work of lawyers and trial
judges is of an ephemeral nature and soon forgotten, but the
opinions of judges of appellate courts are preserved in the
reports. From time to time they are referred to by text writers
and critics of legal literature, and are cited in the briefs pre-
pared in other cases. This insures a sort of permanency to the
reputation of a judge of a court of last resort, if he is fortunate
enough to earn any reputation at all. Doubtless there have been
a good many American supreme court judges who have done
excellent work, worthy of the respect of those who came after
them, but how few are the names that are familiar to the bench
and bar of a later generation. A distinguished writer for the
Harvard Law Review mentions the names of twenty judges of
state supreme courts who have achieved eminence. Among them
occurs the name of Judge Mitchell. Of the others, it is doubtful
whether more than five are known in Minnesota, though all were
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men whose reputations in their several states survive, as his has
survived not only here but in other states as well.
It is proper to inquire what it is that gives him his standing
as one of the great American judges. An attempt to point out
some of the characteristics of his opinions may help to answer
the inquiry. One of the first things that arrests the attention
as these opinions are read and studied is his habit of going back
to the origin of legal principles. He followed what is known
as the historical method, tracing the development of a doctrine
from the time when it first appeared down to the time when his
opinion was written. Almost none of his notable opinions are
without -eferences to the early English authorities. There are
occasional allusions to the Year Books; and Coke, Blackstone,
Mansfield, Eldon, Hale, Holt, and other eminent English judges,
are frequently quoted. Even during the last years of his life,
when he was incessantly pressed for time by reason of the in-
creasing volume of business the court was required to dispatch,
he did not abandon the practice of approaching the study of a
principle from the historical standpoint. This method of
approach leads to regard for the continuity of the law and re-
luctance to override precedents. With him, it did not do so to
the extent that he hesitated to test legal formulas for himself,
although they had been generally accepted and were stamped
with the appproval of eminent judges and writers. Though
he greatly respected, he was never bound by the learning of
the past. He regarded precedents as the guides, not the masters
of the courts. He wanted to know what men in the seventeenth
century thought the law should be, because their conception of
it lies at the root of what men think in our own time and helps
to an understanding of the present.
His attitude towards the common law is best illustrated by
quotations from his opinions. The following are fairly typical:
"Courts have no more right to abrogate the common law than
they have to repeal the statutory law. Lord Coke said: 'The
wisdom of the judges and sages of the law has always sup-
pressed new and subtle inventions in derogation of the commnon
law.' The wise remark of another, peculiarly applicable to the
present time, was that 'the variety of judgments and novelties of
opinions are the two plagues of a commonwealth.' The great
lights of the law may take some liberties with the law in the way
of new applications of old principles that modesty would forbid
to ordinary men; and while we are not disposed" to look upon
everything ancient with slavish reverence merely because it is
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ancient, it would certainly be presumptuous in us to lightly discard
a doctrine which has been so long approved, ahd which is so
firmly established by authority. The principles of the common
law were founded upon practical reasons, and not upon a theo-
retical logical system; and usually, when these principles have
been departed from, the evil consequences of the departure have
developed what these reasons were. The Pandora box that has
been opened by the 'Texas doctrine' proves more forcibly than
argument the wisdom of the common-law rule that damages of
this kind cannot be recovered in actions on contract."'
"It is one of the great excellencies of the common law that it
does not consist of inflexible statutory rules adapted to particular
circumstances, which might become obsolete, but of certain com-
prehensive principles, founded on reason and natural justice, and
adapted to the circumstances of -all cases which fall within them.
When new modes of doing business and new combinations of
facts arise, these same principles will apply; but they must be
adapted to the new situation by considerations of fitness and
reason which grow out of the circumstances." 6
"It is undoubtedly true that many of the doctrines of the
common law had their origin in social or political conditions
which have in whole or in part ceased to exist. But this fact
alone will not usually justify courts in holding that these doc-
trines, when once thoroughly established, have been abrogated,
any more than it would justify them in holding that a statute
had been abrogated because the reason for its enactment had
ceased. Any such rule would leave the body of the common law
very much emasculated .... While, undoubtedly, the common
law consists of a body of principles applicable to new instances
as they arise, and not of inflexible cast-iron rules, yet where the
rules of the common law have become unsuited to changed con-
ditions, political, social, or economic, it is the province of the legis-
lature, and not of the courts, to modify them. '" 7
He sometimes took pleasure in discussing curious doctrines
of the common law, apparently to disclose the arbitrary or unreal
basis of some ancient rule, as witness the following:
"The doctrine that a corpse is not property seems to have
had its origin in the dictum of Lord Coke, (3 Inst. 203) where,
in asserting the authority of the church, he says: 'It is to be
observed that in every sepulchre that hath a monument two
things are to be considered, viz., the monument, and the sepulture
or burial of the dead. The burial of the cadaver that is caro
s Francis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., (1894) 58 Minn. 252, 265,
59 N. W. 1078, 25 L. R. A. 406, 49 A. S. R. 50Z
6 Arthur v. St. Paul & Duluth R. Co., (1887) 38 Minn. 95, 101, 35 N.
W. 718.
7Hulett v. Carey, (1896) 66 Minn. 327, 341, 69 N. W. 31, 34 L. R. A.
384, 61 A. S. R. 419.
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data vermibus (flesh given to worms) is nullius in bonis, and
belongs to ecclesiastical cognizance; but as to the monument
action is given (as hath been said) at the common law, for de-
facing thereof.' If the proposition that a dead body is not
property rests on no better foundation than this etymology of the
word 'cadaver,' its correctness would be more than doubtful.
But while a portion of this dictum, severed from its context, has
been repeatedly quoted as authority for the proposition; yet it
will be observed that it is not asserted that no individual can
have any legal interest in a corpse, but merely that the burial is
nullius in bonis, which was legally true at common law at that
time, as the whole matter of sepulture and custody of the body
after burial was within the exclusive cognizance of the church
and the ecclesiastical courts.""
He never tired of tracing the expansion of the common law to
meet the new conditions that human progress brings about. To
him the common law was a living, growing organism, and he
nowhere better shows this to be true than in the following dis-
cussion of the law relating to the proper public use of highways.
"The question, then, is, what is the nature and extent of the
public easement in a highway? If there is any one fact estab-
lished in the history of society and of the law itself, it is that the
mode of exercising this easement is expansive, developing and
growing as civilization advances. In the most primitive state of
society the conception of a highway was merely a footpath; in
a slightly more advanced state it included the idea of a way for
pack animals; and, next, a way for vehicles drawn by animals,-
constituting, respectively, the 'iter,' the 'actus,' and the 'via' of
the Romans. And thus the methods of using public highways
expanded with the growth of civilization, until today our urban
highways are devoted to a variety of uses not known in former
times, and never dreamed of by the owners of the soil when the
public easement was acquired ...
"Another proposition, which we believe to be sound, is that
the public easement in a highway is not limited to travel or trans-
portation of persons or property in movable vehicles. This is,
doubtless, the principal and most necessary use of highways, and
in a less advanced state of society was the only known use, as
the etymology of the word 'way' indicates. And the courts,
w,hich, as a rule, are exceedingly conservative in following old
definitions, have often seemed inclined to adhere to this original
conception of the purpose of a highway, and to exclude every
form of use that does not strictly come within it."'
8 Larson v. Chase, (1891) 47 Minn. 307, 309, 50 N. W. 238, 14 L. R. A.
85, 28 A. S. R. 370.
9 Cater v. N. W. Tel. Ex. Co., (1895) 60 Minn. 539, 543, 63 N. W. 111.
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His humorous reference to the wilderness of American case
law in Tierney v. Minneapolis and St. Louis Ry. Co.,10 is enter-
taining. He said:
"Of course, in the multitude of cases on this subject with
which the reports abound, often conflicting, and frequently not
well considered, some authority can be found for almost any
proposition...
"The supreme court of Massachusetts is one of the few
whose decisions on this question are anything like consistent, or
seem to be governed by some uniform principle....
"In New York the decisions are so often conflicting that the
value of any particular one largely depends upon the composition
of the court at the time, or the ability of the judge who wrote
the opinion."
And note his biting reference to the modern text-writers:
"The 'Texas doctrine' has been favorably referred to in
many of the more recent text-books, but the bench and bar will
understand of how little weight as authority most of these books
are, written as they very frequently are, by hired professional
book-makers of no special legal ability, and who are usually
inclined, to take up with the.latest legal novelty for the same
reasons that newspaper men are anxious for the latest news.""'
He had the ability to extract the pith from the opinions of
other judges and to set forth their conclusions comprehensively
and clearly. Having done so, he would proceed to state the
true principle as he conceived it to be, the foundation upon which
it rested and, finally, its application to the facts of the case in
hand. This was his usual method and he employed it with telling
effect. Few judges were his equal in power to illuminate the
subject under consideration, and none was his superior. He not
only saw the decisive points in a case himself, but was able to
make others see and understand them also. In a recent letter to
the writer, Dean Woodruff of Cornell University College of Law
dwells on this quality of Judge Mitchell's mind, saying:
"It has seemed to me, as I have read Judge Mitchell's opinions,
that he belongs in the group with Chief Justice Shaw of Massa-
chusetts, Chief Justice Gibson of Pennsylvania, and the few
others who mark the highest achievement of our state courts.
His mind was a quick solvent for the most refractory and opaque
material of legal contention. Take, as typical, his opinion in
Johnson v. Northwestern Life Insurance Company, 56 Minn.
365. The question there involved is one which, although not of
19 (1885) 33 Minn. 311, 320, 23 N. W. 229.
".Francis v. N. W. Tel. Ex. Co., (1894) 58 Minn. 252, 263, 59 N. W.
1078, 25 L. R. A. 406, 49 A. S. R. 507.
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major importance, has given rise to conflict and confusion amount-
ing to something like chaos. He saw directly the human element
that caused the conflict; he reviewed, not at too great length, the
diverse common law precedents and brought them into workable
adjustment by the formulation of a rule which is at once equitable
and pliant; and it is all accomplished with a lucidity and force of
expression that reflect the working of a clear and powerful mind."
The case to which Dean Woodruff refers is one in which the
plaintiff sued to rescind a contract for life insurance he had made
while an infant, and the opinion contains a statement of the
principles applicable to the different situations which may be
presented when an infant seeks to avoid his contract.
Other men prominent in the leading law schools agree in
ranking Judge Mitchell among the great judges of his time.
In a recent letter written by Dean Wigmore of Northwestern
University School of Law, he says:
"My attention was originally called to the late Judge
Mitchell's opinions by Professor James Bradley Thayer of the
Harvard Law School, who used to speak with the highest ad-
miration of Judge Mitchell's opinions. Afterwards I perused
a great many of them in the course of my studies in the law of
evidence and learned to admire them myself. I think that judge
Mitchell's opinions stand out among thiose of his generation as
marked by accurate scholarship, lucid expression and shrewd
good sense. They attain a uniform high level of clarity which is
seldom found. I should count Judge Mitchell as one of the three
or four outstanding judges of the American supreme courts of
his generation."
Professor Thayer's opinion of Judge Mitchell was expressed
in a letter, part of which appears in the report of the memorial
proceedings had soon after the death of the latter.1 2 Among
other things, he said:
"I have long recognized Judge Mitchell as one of the best
judges in this country. There is no occasion for making an
exception of the Supreme Court of the United States. On no
court in the country today is there a judge who would not find
a peer in judge Mitchell."
Professor Samuel Williston of the Harvard Law School
recently wrote of him with equal commendation, saying that
"Judge Mitchell has been regarded in this school as one of the
best judges of his generation."
Professor Edmund M. Morgan of the Yale School of Law
writes that:
12 See 79 Minn. xxix.
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"Every -teacher of law with whom I have talked regards Judge
Mitchell as one of the greatest of American jurists. His ability
to analyze a case and to reduce a legal issue to its lowest terms,
his power of clear statement of legal principles, and his remark-
able facility in the use of concise and expressive English, make
his opinions especially valuable for those teachers who attempt
to give the student training in legal analysis and sound legal
reasoning."
Judge Mitchell cared little for the opinions of others or for
legal doctrines, no matter how orthodox they might be, if they
did not square with the facts of life, were not workable when
applied to business affairs, or were more concerned with form or
sentiment than with substance or experience. A few quotations
will serve to illustrate the point:
"We are aware that there are some eminent authorities to
the contrary, but, with all due deference to them, we cannot
avoid thinking that they base their conclusion upon a fallacious
and somewhat sentimental line of argument as to the inviolability
and sacredness of a man's own person, and his right to its pos-
session and control free from all restraint or interference of
others. This, rightly understood, is all true, but his right to the
possession and control of his person is no more sacred than the
cause of justice."'13
"We recognize the respect due to judicial precedents and the
authority of the doctrine of stare decisis; but, . . do not feel
bound to adhere to it (the rule that an action for damages for
an injury to land must be brought where the land is situated)
notwithstanding the great array of judicial decisions in its favor.
If the courts of England, generations ago, were at liberty to
invent a fiction in order to change the ancient rule that all actions
were local, and then fix their own limitations to the application
of the fiction, we cannot see why the courts of the present day
should deem themselves slavishly bound by those limitations."'14
In speaking of the presumption indulged in by the common
law as to alterations in written instruments, he said:
"All disputable presumptions of law are based upon the ex-
perienced course of human conduct and affairs, and are but the
result of the general experience of a connection between certain
facts; the one being usually found to be the companion or effect
of the other. Hence such presumptions ought to be conformable
to the experience of mankind, and the inferences which, in the
light of that experience, men would naturally draw from a given
state of facts. . . . Whatever might have been the fact for-
13 Wanek v. City of Winona, (1899) 78 Minn. 98. 100, 80 N. W. 851,46 L. R. A. 448, 79 A. S. R. 354.
14 Little v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., (1896) 65 Minn. 48, 53, 67 N. W
846, 33 L. R. A: 423, 60 A. S. R. 421.
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merly, when but few men could write, and when contracts were
usually drawn by skilled conveyancers or scriveners, with great
care and wholly in their own proper handwriting, the rule under
consideration is wholly unsuited to the business habits or usages
of this country at the present day." 15
We find him speaking of the doctrine that an action will not
lie to remove a cloud from title where the instrument creating
the cloud is void on its face, as follows:
"I am aware that it is supported by a long line of venerable
authorities which this court has followed in several cases ...
The rule is based wholly on what Mr. Pomeroy calls verbal logic,
and not upon any principle of justice or common sense..
The doctrine is seriously criticised by some of the best text-
writers, and has been repudiated by some respectable authorities.
It serves no good purpose, but, on the contrary, often results in
a denial of justice. Under these circumstances, it not being a rule
of property, but merely one of practice, I think the sooner we
emancipate ourselves from it the better it will be for the credit
of the court, and for the proper administration of justice."'"
Vigorous common sense was one of his marked traits. He
refused to be confused by misleading phrases, in these words:
"'There is no magic in mere words to change the real into
the unreal. A device of words cannot be imposed upon a court
in place of an actuality of facts.' ",17
Again and again we find him expressing the practical view
of things, which is too often lost sight of by men of the highest
intelligence. For example, note his opinion of the paid expert
witness, written in connection with a consideration of the weight
to be given to expert evidence:
"Experts are nowadays often the mere paid advocates or
partisans of those who employ and pay them, as much so as
the attorneys who conduct the suit. There is hardly anything,
not palpably absurd on its face, that cannot now be proved by
some so-called 'experts.' And, in these personal injury cases,
so-called 'medical experts' can be found who will testify that
almost any disease or ailment to which human flesh is heir was,
in their opinion, caused by the injury. This evil has become so
great in the administration of justice as to attract the serious
consideration of courts and legislatures.' 8
15 Wilson v. Hayes, (1889) 40 Minn. 531, 536, 42 N. W. 467, 12 A. S.
R. 754.16 Maloney -v. Finnegan, (1887) 38 Minn. 70, 73, 35 N. W. 723.
17 Kausal v. Minn. Farmer's Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, (1883) 31 Minn. 17,
21, 16 N. W. 430, 47 A. S. R. 776.
Is Keegan v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., (1899) 76 Minn. 90, 95, 78 N.
W. 965.
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His impatience with insurance that does not insure, and his
practical observations, evidently made for the benefit of the
legislature, are characteristic, for he never hesitated to suggest
to the law-making body any changes or improvements in the law
which his experience on the bench led him to believe desirable.
"We have no patiente with the prolix, obscure, and involved
provisions and conditions which so many so-called co-operative,
life, endowment, casualty insurance, and other similar associations
usually incorporate into their policies and by-laws. The patrons
of such associations are largely composed of people of limited
means, neither astute lawyers nor experienced business men,
whose object is to make moderate provision for their families in
case of death. Whether intended to have such result or not,
such provisions and conditions are calculated to mislead the in-
sured, and entrap him into some act of omission or commission
that will work a forfeiture of his insurance. It would certainly
be a great boon to the public if there could be devised legislative
forms of contracts and rules for all such associations, couched
in clear, concise, and intelligible language, and to or from which
the associations could neither add nor subtract."'19
He occasionally indulged in sarcasm, as witness this, also
written of doubtful insurance:
"We supposed that in the course of our professional and
judicial experience we had met with about all the forms of con-
tract which have been devised by the ingenuity of modem asso.-
ciations of this and similar kinds, but this one is entirely novel
to us. It is certainly unique, and after a careful study of all its
provisions it seems clear to us that it must have been contrived
for the purpose of evading either the insurance laws or the usury
laws, or both, of this state.
'20
Of padded records and briefs, he remarked :2"
"A record of over 1,000 folios, and briefs with 60 assign-
ments of error, appear formidable, but, when carefully sifted,
it will be found that they contain a vast amount of chaff, and
very little grain."
He was of the opinion that most records and briefs suffered
from -the lack of condensation and frequently said that the force
of an argument was too often spent before it reached the vital
issue in the case. Prolixity of statement and the indiscriminate
citation of authorities tended, in his opinion, to obscure rather
'1 Schultz v. Citizens' Mut. Life Ins. Co., (1894) 59 Minn. 308, 315, 61
N. W. 331.
20 Missouri, Kansas & Texas Trust Co., v. McLachlan, (1894) 59 Minn.
468, 473, 61 N. W. 560.
21 Oswald v. Minneapolis Times Co., (1896) 65 Minn. 249, 250, 68 N.
W. 15.
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than to illuminate issues. He had been trained in appellate prac-
tice before the days of stenographers and typewriters when law-
yers wrote their bills of exceptions and briefs instead of printing
the transcript of the testimony and dictating their arguments.
He thoroughly believed that the law, as laid down by the
courts, should conform to business usages and the understand-
ing of men generally, and said so in the following emphatic
language :12
"We may suggest that this entire question is one which should
be determined more upon consideration of business usages and
business policy than of mere theoretical logic."
"The law merchant, including the law of negotiable paper,
is founded upon, and is the creature of, commercial usage
and custom. Custom and usage have really made the law, and
courts, in their decisions, merely declare it. The law of nego-
tiable paper is not only founded on commercial usage, but is
designed to be in aid of trade and commerce. Its rules should,
therefore, be construed with reference to and in harmony with
general business usages, and, as far as possible, with the common
understanding in commercial circles.
'23
In the field of commercial law he advocated uniformity before
the movement for statutory uniformity had fairly begun. He
justly observed that :24
,"It requires some temerity to attack either the policy or the
soundness of a rule which.seems to have stood the test of experi-
ence, which has been approved by so many eminent courts; and
under which the most successful commercial nation in the world
has developed and conducted her vast commerce ever since the
inception of carriers' bills of lading. But on questions of com-
mercial law it is eminently desirable that there should be uni-
formity. It is even more important that the rule be uniform and
certain than that it be the best one that might be adopted."
He was more concerned with the practical than with the
strictly logical application of legal principles. Thus we find him
saying :25
"In strict logic and morally it may be said that he who com-
mits a wrongful act should be answerable for all the losses which
flow from that act, however remote. But, as has been said, it
were infinite for the law to attempt to do this, and any such rule
22Northern Trust Co. v. Rogers, (1895) 60 Minn. 208, 210, 62 N.
W. 273.
23 Hastings v. Thompson, (1893) 54 Minn. 184, 189, 55 N. W. 968, 21
L. R. A. 178, 40 A. S. R. 315.2 4 Natl Bank of Commerce v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1890) 44 Minn.
224, 235, 46 N. W. 324, 560, 9. L. R. A. 263, 20 A. S. R. 566.
25 North v. Johnson, (1894) 58 Minn. 242, 245, 59 N. W. 1012.
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would set society on edge, and fill the courts with endless litiga-
tion. Hence the law has been compelled to adopt the practical
rule of looking only to the proximate cause, and to the natural
and proximate or immediate and direct result."
"On this state of the authorities, we feel at liberty to adopt
whichever rule (permissible on principle) we think the safest,
most convenient and equitable in practice; keeping in mind that
it is more important to work practical justice than to preserve
the logical symmetry of a rule, provided this can be done without
destroying all rules, and leaving the law on the subject all at
sea."
2 6
He distrusted novelties in the law. One or two quotations
show his attitude:
"It is true that this court has never before been called on to
decide the question, and that mere assumption on the part of
either bench or bar does not make a thing law; but, on the other
hand, it is also true that a construction which has for a third of
a century been accepted by every one as so obviously correct as
never to have been questioned or doubted is much more likely to
be right than a newly-discovered one, suggested at this late day
by 'the emergencies of present litigation.27
"Aside from its being a novelty in the law, which is always
dangerous, I do not think it rests 6n any sound principle." 2
His views on the proper functions of the state, a. question
now agitating the minds of many men, are worth recalling. They
were the views of a man of wisdom-forward looking, liberal
but not radical, and conscious of the value of today's inheritance
from yesterday. They were those of one who was anxious that
political institutions should afford men free scope for individual
growth while restraining reckless fanatics who are ever ready to
destroy what society has painfully acquired through self-control
learned in the hard school of experience.
Equally interesting is his conception of the functions of the
different departments of government as defined in the constitu-
tion. It is what one would expect it to be in a man of his school
of thought. It is worth while to compare the reasoned convic-
tions of a man of wisdom and sound judgment whose mind had
been formed during the middle years of the nineteenth century
with the popular notions of today. Such a comparison makes
26 Jordahl v. Berry, (1898) 72 Minn. 119, 122, 75 N. W. 10, 45 L. R. A.
541, 71 A. S. R. 469.
2. Willis v. Mabon, (1892) 48 Minn. 140, 149, 50 N. W. 1110, 16 L. R.
A. 281, 31 A. S. R. 626.2S Carlson v. N. W. Tel. Ex. Co., (1896) 63 Minn. 428, 442, 65 N. W.
914.
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one aware of how far we have drifted from the moorings of less
restless and unsettled days. By collecting some of the things he
wrote, we get his point of. view. That of the man on the street
today is so familiar as to need no comment.
"The courts are not the guardians of the rights of the people,
except as these rights are secured by some constitutional provi-
sion which comes within the judicial cognizance. The protection
against and remedy for, unwise or oppressive legislation, within
constitutional bounds, is by appeal to the justice and patriotism
of the people themselves, or their legislative representatives.
Neither are courts at liberty to declare an act void merely
because, in their judgment, it is opposed to the spirit of the
constitution. They must be able to point out the specific pro-
vision of the constitution, either expressed or clearly implied
from what is expressed, which the act violates."2 9
Of special interest is his discussion of the police power and
of changes in the forms of government which were already advo-
cated *in his day, though not with the insistence of today. He
held that only by direct amendments of the constitution could
the powers of the state be enlarged beyond the limits fixed by its
framers. He was opposed to the doctrine that anything which
a passing majority of the people believe to be for the public' good
may be enacted in a statute which must be held valid as an exer-
cise of the police power, although it offends a plain mandate of
the constitution.
"The police power of the state to regulate a business does not
include the power to engage in carrying it on. Police regulation
is to be effected by restraints upon a business, and the adoption
of rules and regulations as to the manner in which it shall be
conducted.
"While the jurists of continental Europe sometimes include
under the term 'police power' all governmental institutions
which are established with public funds for the promotion of the
public good, yet, as understood in American constitutional law,
the term means simply the power of the state to impose those
restraints upon private rights which are necessary for the gen-
eral welfare of all.
"The time was when the policy was to confine the functions
of government to the limits strictly necessary to secure the
enjoyment of life, liberty, and property. The old Jeffersonian
maxim was that the country is governed the best that is governed
the least. At present, the tendency is all the other way, and
towards socialism and paternalism in government. This ten-
29 Lommen v. Minneapolis Gas Light Co., (1896) 65 Minn. 196, 208, 68
N. NV. 53.
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dency is, perhaps, to some extent, natural, as well as inevitable, as
population becomes more dense, and society older, and more com-
plex in its relations. The wisdom of such a policy is not for the
courts. The people are supreme, and, if they wish to adopt such
a change in the theory of government, it is their right to. do so.
But in order to do it they must amend the constitution of the
state. The present constitution was not framed on any such
lines."30
He saw the selfish interests standing behind laws enacted
ostensibly to promote the public welfare, saying :31
"A law enacted in the exercise of the police power must in
fact be a police law. . . In this day, when so many selfish
and private schemes in the way of securing monopolies and
excluding competition in trade are attempted under the mask of
sanitary legislation, it may be an important question whether the
judiciary are concluded by the mask, or whether they may tear
it aside in order to ascertain who is in it."
He did not look upon the constitution as the only source of
guarantees of those inalienable rights to which reference was
made in the high sounding phrases of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, for he declared that :2
"The guaranty of a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries
to persons, property, or character, and other analogous pro-
visions . . . are but declaratory of general fundamental prin-
ciples, founded in natural right and justice, and which would
be equally the law of the land if not incorporated in the con-
stitution." '
He justified governmental regulation of railroads, apparently
upon the ground that it was the only alternative to governmental
ownership. In his time, the latter alternatikre was generally
considered to be quite impossible. It was then a conclusive
demonstration of the propriety of regulation to show that with-
out it public ownership would be inevitable. In the light of
recent events, this statement made some thirty year ago is of
more than historical interest :3
"In fact, it was settled in the only way -that any such ques-
tion can be permanently settled, viz., in accordance with public
policy and public necessity, for no modern -civilized community
could long endure that their public highway system should be
in the uncontrolled, exclusive use of private owners. The only
30 Rippe v. Becker, (1894) 56 Minn. 100, 57 N. W. 331, 22 L. R. A. 857.
31 State v. Donaldson, (1889) 41 Minn. 74, 82, 42 N. W. 781.32 Allen v. Pioneer Press Co., (1889) 40 Minn. 117, 41 N. W. 936, 3 L.
R. A. 532, 12 A. S. R. 707.
33 State v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., (1888) 38 Minn. 281, 37 N. W. 782.
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alternative was either governmental regulation or governmental
ownership of the roads.
"In fact, this must be so, if the legislature is to be permitted
effectually to exercise its constitutional powers. If this was not
permissible, the wheels of government would often be blocked,
and the sovereign state find itself helplessly entangled in the
meshes of its own constitution."
He comprehended the problems involved in the relations of
capital and labor. His views were enlightened and free from
prepossessions in favor of either. A few selections bring out
his point of view.
"It is sometimes said that mankind will seek cessation of
labor at proper times by the natural influences of the law of
self-preservation; also that, if a man desires to engage on Sun-
day in any kind of work or business which does not interfere
with the rights -of others, he has an absolute right to do so,
and to choose his own time of rest, as he sees fit. The answer
to this is that all men are not in fact independent and at liberty
to work when they choose. Labor is in a great degree dependent
upon capital, and, unless the exercise of power which capital
affords is restrained, those who are obliged to labor will not
possess the freedom for rest which they would otherwise
exercise."3 4
"The case presents one phase of a subject which is likely to
be one of the most important and difficult which will confront
the courts during the -next quarter of a century. This is the
age of associations and unions, in all departments of labor and
business, for purposes of mutual benefit and protection. Con-
fined to proper limits, both as to end and means, they are not
only lawful, but laudable. Carried beyond those limits, they are
liable to become dangerous agencies for wrong and oppression.
Beyond what limits these associations or combinations cannot
go, without interfering with the legal rights of others, is the
problem which, in various phases, the courts will doubtless be
frequently called to pass upon. There is, perhaps, danger that,
influenced by such terms of illusive meaning as 'monopolies,'
'trusts,' 'boycotts,' 'strikes,' and the like, they may be ledt to
transcend the limits of their jurisdiction, and, like the court of
king's bench in Bagg's Case, 11 Coke, 98a, assume that, on gen-
eral principles, they have authority to correct or reform every-
thing which they may deem wrong, or, as Lord Ellsmere -puts
it, 'to manage the state.' . . . It is perfectly lawful for any
man (unless under contract obligation, 6r unless his employment
charges him with some public duty) to refuse to .work for or to
deal with any man or class of men, as he sees fit. This doctrine
is founded upon the fundamental right of every man to conduct
34 State v. Petit, (1898) 74 Minn. 376, 379, 77 N. W. 225.
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his own business in. his own way, subject only to the condition
that he does not interfere with the legal rights of others. And,
as has been already said, the right which one man may exercise
singly, many, after consultation, may agree to exercise jointly,
and make simultaneous declaration of their choice." 35
"Modem investigations have much modified the views of
courts as well as political economists as to the effect of contracts
tending to reduce the number of competitors in any particular
line of business. Excessive competition is not now accepted
as necessarily conducive to the public good. The fact is that
the early common law doctrine in regard to contracts in re-
straint of trade largely grew out of a state of society and of
business which has ceased to exist."36
There was a time in the history of Minnesota when numerous
corporations were organized which were not successful. The
state constitution provides that a stockholder in any corporation
except one organized to carry on a manufacturing or mechan-
ical business shall be liable to creditors to the amount of stock
held or owned by him. The legislature had made some provision
for the enforcement of this liability and for the sequestration of
the property of an insolvent corporation, but the nature and
extent of a stockholder's liability had not been clearly defined
and the procedure in working it out had not been settled. In a
series of cases in which the opinions were written by- Judge
Mitchell, the whole subjeot was exhaustively considered and the
field it occupied thoroughly explored. This series of cases begins
with State v. Minnesota Thresher Co., 37 and ends with Hospes
v. N. W. Mfg. & Car Co.3 s On reading the ten or more opinions
which make up the series, one is impressed with the great amount
of labor that was required to master the facts and with the
clearness of statement that makes them comprehensible to the
reader. He grasps the intricate methods of "high finance," per-
ceives the ends that promoters had in view, and his sturdy common
sense and innate honesty are revealed as he marshals and analyzes
the facts. He formulates and demonstrates legal principles with
the sureness and lucidity characteristic of a trained and logical
mind and follows with a statement of the conclusions which
seem to be as inevitable as those in geometry. His treatment
35 Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, (1893) 54 Minn. 223, 231, 55 N. W. 1119,
21 L. R, A..337, 40 A. S. R. 319.
36"National Benefit Co. v. Union Hospital Co., (1891) 45 Minn. 272,
275, 47 N. W. 806.
3T (1889) 40 Minn. 213, 41 N. W. 1020, 3 L. R. A. 510.
38 (1892) 48 Minn. 174, 50 N. W. 1117, 15 L. R. A. 470, 31, A. S. R. 637.
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of the "trust fund" doctrine in the Hospes case reveals his
methods as well as anything he wrote while on the bench. There
are many who assert that he never wrote a better opinion and
its quality is attested by the fact that it is accepted everywhere
today as the best exposition of the subject in existence.
His standard of legal ethics was high. He belonged to the
old school of lawyers who believed that theirs was an honorable
profession and not a commercial calling. He had scant patience
with those who would forget the distinction, or with those who
stir up litigation. A few quotations suffice to show his stand-
ards:
"The old common-law rules on the subject of champerty have
doubtless been much modified, but the essential principle upon
which those rules rested, and the evils and abuses at which they
were aimed, still exist. The general purpose of the law . . . was
to prevent vexatious or speculative litigation, which "would disturb
the peace of society, lead to corrupt practices, and prevent the
remedial process of the law. All contracts or practices which
necessarily and manifestly tend to produce these results ought
still to be held void on grounds of public policy."39
"Blackstone speaks of men who are perpetually endeavoring
to disturb the repose of their neighbors, and officiously inter-
fering with other men's quarrels, as 'the pests of civil society.'
This view was not peculiar to the common law. The Roman
law animadverted with equal severity on this class of men and
their practices. This class of men in the form of 'prowling
assignees' and intermeddling speculators are unfortunately just
as numerous, and their practices just as pernicious, as they ever
were."
40
"This sort of petty foraging upon the poor and ignorant is,
in our opinion, one of the most reprehensible forms of profes-
sional misconduct." 41
It is a common belief that to be a good judge a man must
live a cloistered life .and have a mind wholly absorbed in the.
study of cases and briefs to the neglect of everything else. Like
many popular notions, it is largely fanciful. Judge Mitchell lived
in this world and not in a world of abstractions. His study of
cases and briefs did not exclude him from sharing in the common
interests of -ordinary men. His mind was stored with the fruits
of his observations, as witness his portrayal of boyish traits in
39 Gammons v. Johnson, (1899) 76 Minn. 76, 81, 7'8 N. W. 1035.
4OHuber v. Johnson, (1897) 68 Minn. 74. 78, 70 N. W. 806.
41 In re Temple, (1885) 33 Minn. 343, 345, 23 N. W. 463.
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Twist v. Winona & St. Peter R. Co.,42 and of the habits of In-
dians in State v. Cooney.43
In the first case, he said :44
"To the irrepressible spirit of curiosity and intermeddling of
the average boy there is no limit to -the objects which can be made
attractive playthings. In the exercise of his youthful ingenuity,
he can make a plaything out of almost anything, and then so use
it as to expose himself to danger, If all this is to be charged to
natural childish instincts, and the owners of property are to be
required to anticipate and guard against it, the result would be
that it would be unsafe for a man to own property, and the duty
of the protection of children would be charged upon every mem-
ber of the community except the parents or the children them-
selves."
And in the second, that :45
"The idea of these Indians buying game from those who
keep it for sale will cause a smile of incredulity on the part of
those -who know them best; but, even if they do sometimes buy
it, it is the Indian who kills and sells the game, or the trader
who keeps it for sale, and not the Indian who buys it for food,
who is benefited. If an Indian has the money with which to
buy venison, he is able to buy beef or some other article of food
with his money. I know of no more effectual method of de-
pleting game, in both Indian reservations and the adjacent
country, than to hold that Indians may kill it for purposes of
barter and sale, or that traders may buy and keep it for sale,
during the closed season."
Overworked judges have little opportunity for investigation.
As a rule they have not the time to trace the streams of law to
their fountain-head or to write elaborate and exhaustive opinions.
During Judge Mitchell's time the business of the court increased
rapidly. The flood of personal injury litigation had begun to
come and there were no stenographers, typewriters or copyists
to assist the judges in the preparation of their opinions. Evi-
dences of the high pressure under which the court worked crop
out every now and then in his opinions, and yet to the very last,
in all the more important cages in which he wrote, he adhered
to the same painstaking method of ascertaining and stating the
law and giving it application to the case in, hand that character-
ized his early opinions when the work of the court was far less
42 (1888) 39 Minn. 164, 39 N. W. 402, 12 A. S. R. 626.
43 (1899) 77 Minn. 518, 80 N. W. 696.
44Twist v. Winona & St. Peter R. Co., (1888) 39 Minn. 164, 167, 39
Minn. 402, 12 A. S. R. 626.
45 State v. Cooney, (1899) 77 Minn. 518, 522, 80 N. W. 696.
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burdensome. We find him referring to lack of time for further
investigation or discussion in opinions which to us seem wholly
adequate. When he left the bench the court was disposing of
upwards of four hundred cases per year. When he went upon
it, less than two hundred cases per year were on the calendars.
It would be natural to assume that his earlier opinions dealt
more exhaustively with the cases decided than his later ones
when he was writing them more than twice as rapidly. Such is
not the case however. There are no evidences of haste in" the
later series. Neither are there any marks of "brain fag" such as
sometimes appears in the work of a man who has been employed
for many years in arduous mental labor. To the very last, when-
ever a case out of the ordinary was assigned to him, he writes
with buoyancy and evident interest. His style is as refreshing
and his mariner of treatment as alert and individual as ever. His
opinions dealt almost wholly with cases involving private con-
troversies. Few of great public importance came before the
court while he was one of its members. There were many involv-
ing important questions of substantive law. Their decision has
had a permanent influence on the jurisprudence of the state. Its
framework was erected during his time. The fundamental prin-
ciples of our jurisprudence having been framed, there remained
the application of those principles to the ever varying facts pre-
sented by individual cases. The court had already entered upon
this period in its work when he left the bench. In a way, he had
completed the task he was so well qualified to do-that of giving
shape to the body of the common law as it exists in this common-
wealth today. In the decision of individual cases between private
parties, principles of human conduct were approved or disap-
proved, business usages sanctioned, personal rights recognized,
and a system of laws for the government of men in their rela-
tions with one another gradually built up on the solid foundation
of Anglo Saxon common law. Judge Mitchell was one of the
chief artificers, and how well he built is now a matter of common
knowledge among lawyers, while laymen who never heard of
him unconsciously enjoy the benefits of the enlightened juris-
prudence he had so large a part in shaping.
Quotations from Judge Mitchell's opinions have been freely
made for the reason that it has seemed that they best reveal his
mind and character to those who did not know him. From them,
one gets glimpses of his philosophy and his sympathies, and a
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clear perception of his mental processes. However great one's
admiration for him may be, it cannot but be deepened by the
consecutive reading of a considerable number of his opinions.
The methods of one man cannot be unconditionally recommended
for the imitation of another, but young lawyers may well be
guided, in dealing with legal problems, by a study of his methods.
Though few men are gifted with the great natural abilities he
possessed, the ordinary man may become a good lawyer or
capable judge by following his practice of patient and thorough'
investigation of the facts and the law in each case to be dealt with,
and by keeping in mind, as he did, the fact that in the pursuit of
truth it is necessary to draw freely upon the learning and ex-
perience of others because of the narrowness of individual knowl-
edge and experience.
The final factor in his successful career as a judge was the
character of his associates on the bench. In this respect he was
singularly fortunate. One able judge alone cannot make a great
court, but when he is one of a group of able men, his and their
work inevitably gains in quality, and the decisions of the court
acquire a standing and authority they would not otherwise enjoy.
Minnesota has produced a number of judges who ranked with
the best in other states. Judge Mitchell was aware of the .ability
of his associates. In speaking of them at the memorial exercises
for Chief Justice Gilfillan, he said:
"One of the chief inducements to my acceptance of a place
on this bench, was -the rare combination of talents possessed by
the three judges then composing this court. There was Justice
Cornell, with his remarkably clear, acute intellect, Justice Berry,
with his sound judgment and great fund of practical common
sense, and Chief Justice Gilfillan, with his great mental vigor
and remarkable power of analysis."
His estimate, on that occasion, of Judge Gilfillan is in large
measure applicable to himself. Equally applicable are the words
of Chief Justice Start on the 'ame occasion. With them, this
sketch may well be concluded, for of Judge Mitchell, as well as
of Judge Gilfillan, it may be truly said that:
"The special work, to which he gave long and laborious years
of useful service, was the molding of the jurisprudence of our
young state. To this work he brought natural abilities of a
high order, the ripe experience of a learned lawyer, a keen sense
of justice, an extraordinary command of the resources of reason,
perfect integrity and great moral courage. His judicial opinions
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are the rich fruit of that work. . .. These opinions are a
monument to his fame as a jurist. That fame will widen as the
* years advance."
EDWARD LEES *
*Commissioner of the Supreme Court of Minnesota.
